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Abstract The role of knowledge in the policy process remains a central theoretical
puzzle in policy analysis and political science. This article argues that an important yet
missing piece of this puzzle is the systematic exploration of the political use of policy
knowledge. While much of the recent debate has focused on the question of how the
substantive use of knowledge can improve the quality of policy choices, our understanding
of the political use of knowledge and its effects in the policy process has remained deficient
in key respects. A revised conceptualization of the political use of knowledge is introduced
that emphasizes how conflicting knowledge can be used to contest given structures of
policy authority. This allows the analysis to differentiate between knowledge creep and
knowledge shifts as two distinct types of knowledge effects in the policy process. While
knowledge creep is associated with incremental policy change within existing policy
structures, knowledge shifts are linked to more fundamental policy change in situations
when the structures of policy authority undergo some level of transformation. The article
concludes by identifying characteristics of the administrative structure of policy systems or
sectors that make knowledge shifts more or less likely.
Keywords Evidence-based policy making  Knowledge creep  Knowledge utilization 
Organizational epistemology  Punctuated equilibrium theory
Introduction
The role of knowledge in the policy process has remained a central theoretical puzzle in
policy analysis and political science. Yet studies of knowledge use have profited little from
the parallel debates in both fields of research. As Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988: 123)
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pointed out some time ago, ‘one of the most surprising—and distressing—aspects of the
literature on knowledge utilization is that it has developed largely independently of the
literature in political science on the factors affecting the policy process.’ Despite repeated
calls for a better integration of both literatures in the years that followed (e.g., Jones et al.
2014: 166–67; James and Jorgensen 2009: 143; Radaelli 1995: 162; Rich and Oh 1993: 85;
Webber 1992: 414), most of this research continued to develop independently. This has
resulted in a fragmented empirical grasp and unreconciled theoretical understandings of the
role of knowledge in the policy process. The more recent surge in the literature on evi-
dence-based policy making has focused the debate on questions of how knowledge use can
improve the quality of policy choices. These studies largely follow in the tradition of early
knowledge utilization research (Newman and Head 2015: 384; Kay 2011: 236; Weiss et al.
2008: 44). While this literature has made significant progress (see Mead 2015; Newman
and Head 2015 for a recent discussion), it has contributed little to advance our theoretical
understanding of the role of knowledge in the policy process. Instead, most of this debate
appears premised on a preconceived understanding of how knowledge should be used in
the policy process, and to what end. This has steered the debate further away from a
broader consideration of the different functions of policy knowledge. Understanding dif-
ferent types of knowledge use and how they affect the policy process therefore remains a
key concern of current research.
This article argues that an important yet missing piece of this puzzle is the systematic
exploration of the political use of policy knowledge. As the article will show, the
political use of knowledge is given surprisingly short shrift in the standard literature.
Instead, much of the debate remains firmly rooted in the assumption that ‘politics’
constrains the use and counteracts the effects of knowledge in policy making. The article
challenges this notion by elaborating an alternative theoretical perspective. This per-
spective is premised on the view that knowledge is bound by the organizational structure
of policy making and used in the policy process to expand policy authority and exercise
control. A major theoretical implication of this perspective is that certain types of policy
conflicts can become catalysts of knowledge use that affect the policy process in fun-
damental ways. The article therefore argues that the political use of knowledge can be
linked to a much more diverse set of policy dynamics than covered by the standard
literature. This literature identifies the slow, indirect and cumulative effect of ‘knowledge
creep’ (Weiss 1980, 1982, 1986) as the preeminent influence of analytic information in
the policy process. In contrast, this article argues that shifts in the political knowledge
base can interact with structural determinants of policy change to produce fundamental
policy readjustments that are more akin to policy punctuations. This type of knowledge
shift is not caused by policy learning in given decision-making structures, but by
political and administrative contestation over the way issues are categorized and prob-
lematized in the policy process.
The article is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief introduction to
the theoretical debate. The discussion then focuses on existing concepts of the political
use of knowledge in the policy process. This literature is found to be deficient, and a
revised conceptualization of political knowledge use is proposed. The article then
explores the organizational foundations of knowledge use and finally discusses how a
focus on the organizational characteristics of policy system or sectors can help to explain
different types of knowledge effects in the policy process. The conclusion summarizes
the main points and highlights how the analysis contrasts with established positions in
this field of research.
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Knowledge creep and the enlightenment model of knowledge use
Much of the early academic debate in this field was driven by an expanding under-
standing of policy knowledge and its functions in the policy process. Initially, the focus
was limited to concrete or technical knowledge and its role in improving policy choices.
This type of instrumental use of policy information has sometimes been called the
‘engineering model’ (Knorr 1977). Research in this tradition soon faced a major paradox.
While an ever-increasing amount of policy-relevant information was produced and dis-
seminated, studies of knowledge use almost equivocally attest to the fact that little of this
knowledge ever enters the decision-making realm. In light of these disconcerting results,
a competing interpretation of research findings emerged that challenged the conceptual
premises of the debate. The perceived gap between knowledge production and utilization
came to be seen partially as an artifact of the exceedingly narrow understanding of
knowledge use that dominated much of the early studies in this field of research (Caplan
1979: 468; Pelz 1978). The distinction between concrete and conceptual knowledge use
was introduced to underline that early research was struggling with this multifaceted role
of knowledge in the policy process (Weiss 1977a; Rich 1977). This research emphasized
that there are more ways in which knowledge can influence policy choices than by
producing reliable empirical predictions about the relationship between preconceived
means and ends. Weiss (1977b) claimed that knowledge can inform policy making also
by challenging the underlying assumptions and analytical concepts that structure policy
choices. Her enlightenment model highlights how information can enter the policy
process in ways that alter the decision makers’ fundamental understanding of the issues
at stake. Policy knowledge, according to Weiss (1999: 146), supplies decision makers
with the ‘background of ideas, concepts and information that increased their under-
standing of the policy terrain.’ From this perspective, the primary function of information
in the policy process is seen as providing ‘insights into the nature of social problems’
(Weiss 1995: 141). As a result, researchers also began to operate with a much broader
definition of policy knowledge. Weiss’ (1986: 279) use of the term, for example,
encompasses ‘research, analysis, evaluation, data.’ Most of the more recent contributions
have similarly opted for such a broader definition of policy knowledge. Radaelli (1995:
162–63), in one of the classic articles on the issue, acknowledges the role of ‘hard’
policy information defined as scientific knowledge, but argues that this type only con-
stitutes one end of a continuum. At the same time, the enlightenment model also
established a new understanding of the process through which knowledge influences
policy choices. While previous research on instrumental knowledge use was associated
with expectations of direct and immediate effects of available information on policy
choices, the enlightenment model describes policy dynamics that work ‘in the long term’
(Weiss et al. 2005: 14). ‘Perhaps it takes 5 or 10 years or more before decision makers
respond to the accumulation of consistent evidence,’ Weiss (1993: 98) argues. One
reason for this was that conceptual knowledge use was seen as much more diffuse and
indirect. To capture the long-term effects of information on the policy process, Weiss
(1980, 1982, 1986) introduced the term ‘knowledge creep.’ According to Weiss, new
information and ideas ‘seep into people’s consciousness and alter the way that issues are
framed and alternatives designed’ (1999: 471). Knowledge creep therefore describes a
‘slow trickle’ that produces ‘slow results’ (Weiss 1999: 472).
Several decades after its initial formulation, the enlightenment model has established
itself as one of the dominant research perspectives in studies of knowledge use. It has
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been assessed to capture ‘the most important effect that research and evaluation have had
on policy’ (Weiss et al. 2005: 14). At the same time, the model remains insufficiently
theorized in key respects. Weiss (1986: 278) herself notes that the concept of knowledge
creep is a largely descriptive metaphor and that little is known about the mechanisms and
conditions under which information produces enlightenment effects. While students of
knowledge use have grown increasingly impatient with a field of study that is ‘generally
silent on the range of underlying mechanisms’ (Mark and Henry 2004: 37), few suc-
cessful attempts have been made to address these shortcomings (Weiss et al. 2005:
26–27). Arguably the most prominent theoretical elaboration of the enlightenment model
in the context of policy research can be found in the work of Paul Sabatier on policy
learning. Sabatier developed his well-known framework as an attempt to build directly
on the enlightenment model and integrate it into theories of policy learning (Sabatier
1988: 158; 1987: 649; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1988: 124). Yet in terms of its
contribution to knowledge research, Sabatier’s work stands out as conservative. In
contrast to the enlightenment model, Sabatier’s main interest lies with the role of
technical knowledge in the policy process (e.g., Sabatier 1997: 4). Partially as a result of
his more limited focus, he finds that knowledge interventions are most likely to affect
policy choices if decision-making power is delegated to apolitical expert arenas, and
when the issues under consideration allow for straightforward scientific appraisal (Sa-
batier 1997: 4, 1988: 159). Knowledge effects are seen as primarily affecting secondary
aspects of policy formulation, such as instrument choice and implementation strategies.
Changes at the level of the underlying perception of problem structures, on the other
hand, are largely shielded from evidentiary influence. Unsurprisingly, critics have
charged that his theory of policy learning departs substantially from key interests of the
enlightenment model that was its original point of departure (e.g., James and Jorgensen
2009; Fischer 2003; Bennett and Howlett 1992).
With the outlined shift from instrumental to conceptual use, knowledge research has
overcome a rationalist bias that characterized the early work in this field, but it has also
remained limited in several respects. Founded on a largely implicit notion of policy
learning, the use of conceptual knowledge has become closely associated with a single type
of knowledge effect that is described as diffuse, indirect and difficult to observe. Even
more importantly, research in the enlightenment tradition also remains solidly focused on
the substantive dimension of knowledge use. It largely ignores the question of how the
influx of knowledge about the nature and structure of policy problems affects the political
process beyond informing the search for suitable policy solutions. The next section will
argue that conceptual knowledge also has a political function in the policy process that
much of the existing literature fails to address. As a result, central mechanisms of
knowledge transfer and corresponding knowledge effects in the policy process have
remained underexplored.
Reconceptualizing the political use of policy knowledge
The political or strategic use of conceptual knowledge is given surprisingly short shrift in
the standard literature (see Whiteman 1985). While political use is frequently listed
alongside instrumental and conceptual use as a major area of inquiry (e.g., Head 2013),
existing research on the political use of knowledge has adopted a rather limited research
focus. Most studies conceptualize the political use of knowledge as little more than a ‘fig
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leaf of rationality for policy positions adopted on altogether different grounds’ (Weiss and
Gruber 1984: 228). In a still influential contribution, Carol Weiss (1977a: 15) defines
political use as the type of use that is meant ‘to support a predetermined position.’ Sim-
ilarly, Whiteman (1985: 206), in an otherwise critical review of the literature, proposes a
definition of political use as the ‘use of analytic information to advocate and reaffirm
policy positions after they have been determined.’ According to his typological scheme,
the fact that information enters the decision-making process only after policy positions
have been reached is the ‘only significant difference’ (Whiteman 1985: 206) between
political use and other types of knowledge use. The vast majority of research follows in
this tradition. In a recent overview of the literature, Weible (2008: 620) discusses existing
studies of political use in almost identical terms and defines political use as strategies to
‘legitimize previously made policy decisions.’ Owing in large part to the narrow con-
ceptual focus, the political use of knowledge is often described as little more than symbolic
posturing and has been associated with political behavior that uses analytical information
‘selectively and often distortingly’ (Knorr 1977: 171). Critics of this limited understanding
of the phenomenon maintain that the political function of knowledge remains poorly
understood and that by focusing on the use of evidence as a way to conceal predetermined
preferences existing studies have addressed ‘a rather uninteresting tip of the iceberg’
(Weiss and Gruber 1984: 228). Yet the quest to explore more extensively how knowledge
can gain political currency beyond the well-established analysis of substantive and sym-
bolic use has proven difficult.
In an early attempt to expand the focus of this debate, Weiss and Gruber depart from
the more general observation that ‘in a world of complex governance and shared control,
it is not enough to discover the best possible decision’ (Weiss and Gruber 1984: 226).
Instead, the authors argue, policy makers ‘typically value knowledge for its contributions
to the exercise of political control’ (Weiss and Gruber 1984: 225). Their argument
constitutes a fundamental break with standard perspectives in this field of research.
While existing studies acknowledge the fact that some of the more fundamental policy
conflicts are not about policy substance per se, but also about the distribution of policy
authority and political control, these types of conflicts are almost invariably seen as
diminishing both the likelihood of knowledge use and its impact on policy choices. The
notion that conflict over the distribution of policy competences can be a catalyst of
knowledge use and affect the policy process in fundamental ways has remained
uncharted territory. As a result, important research questions have been largely omitted
from the academic debate.
In the broader field of policy research, arguments that inquire into the link between
knowledge use and the distribution of policy authority have played a more prominent role.
Discussing Hall’s (1993) seminal work on policy change, for example, Baumgartner (2013:
240) in a recent review reiterates Hall’s (1993: 280) point that if conflicting knowledge
triggers fundamental policy change, this will likely happen in conjunction with significant
shifts in the distribution of policy authority. Whether or not competing knowledge affects
policy choices, Baumgartner (2013: 253) goes on to argue, often depends on whether
available knowledge can be used to challenge established patterns of influence in the policy
process. On a more general level, Hall’s work also begs the question of whether knowledge
use that hinges on parallel shifts in policy authority can still be usefully categorized as a
type of policy learning (Pierson 1993: 614–615). Instead, Hall’s (1993) argument about
fundamental or paradigmatic policy change draws attention to the fact that policy
knowledge can be understood to inform the choices of a given set of actors or institutions
who are empowered to set policy in a certain area, or it can be understood to inform the
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choices over how the authority to set policy is allocated in the first place. As Jones (1994:
50) points out, policy problems are ‘not just illuminated by information, they are framed by
it.’ Every piece of information that enters the policy process highlights certain aspects
about the scope and nature of a policy problem and ignores others. Competing expertise is
therefore central to claims concerning the contours and classification of policy problems.
This has direct implications for the way policy systems address problems and how they
allocate authority over policy choices. Yet research on knowledge use provides no con-
ceptual category to study these effects. For the most part, even more recent theoretical
discussions of knowledge utilization conflate conceptual and enlightenment use (e.g.,
Newman and Head 2015: 388; Mark and Henry 2004: 36), and they overlook that con-
ceptual knowledge can have both substantive and political effects on policy. It is therefore
paramount that knowledge research expands its understanding of the political use of
knowledge in the policy process. This argument follows Whiteman’s (1985) two-dimen-
sional perspective on knowledge use. The ‘key to developing a two-dimensional per-
spective,’ Whiteman (1985: 205) argues, ‘is recognizing that strategic use is not distinct
from concrete and conceptual use. Instead, like substantive use, strategic use can be either
concrete or conceptual.’ At the same time, this article differs from Whiteman (1985) on the
level of the typological distinctions. Any definition of the political use of knowledge that
points exclusively to the use of knowledge as post hoc rationalization of predetermined
policy positions as the defining characteristic reduces the scope of analysis to such an
extent as to prevent any meaningful investigation of the phenomenon.




A more reflective conceptualization of the political use of knowledge would encompass
the use of analytic information to establish or contest authority and control over policy
choices. This conceptualization points to rather different conditions and mechanisms of
knowledge use and different effects on the policy process than those described by the
literature discussed above. For example, the enlightenment model theorizes that substan-
tive use of conceptual knowledge is most likely to play a role in the policy process if it
‘disturbs few social arrangements and institutional interests’ (Weiss 1976: 225). The
reverse logic applies in the case of the political use of conceptual knowledge. Here
knowledge enters the decision-making process because policy authority is contested and
competing organizations draw on knowledge to shape problem perceptions and substan-
tiate claims of competence in their attempts to gain issue control. This view highlights that
the organizational level of analysis is central to arguments of political knowledge use.
While organizational structures limit knowledge use and transfer in important ways, they
also affect the way in which conflicting knowledge enters the policy process. The next
section will address the role of the organizational level of analysis in explanations of
knowledge use in more detail. At the same time, the effects of political knowledge use on
the policy process are expected to differ substantially from the effects of knowledge use in
the enlightenment model. The notion of knowledge creep assumes that information slowly
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alters the way decision makers address substantial policy problems as knowledge accu-
mulates and diffuses over time. The political use of knowledge highlights the transfor-
mative effects of competing knowledge when policy authority and the delineation of
responsibilities become contested. This part of the argument will be addressed in the
section after next.
Organizational epistemologies and the limits of learning
As discussed above, the vast majority of the more recent research on knowledge use is
premised on the notion that knowledge is most relevant when it contributes conceptual
insights into the nature and structure of policy problems. Studies of conceptual knowl-
edge use therefore inquire how policy knowledge affects the way policy issues are
framed for decision making (Weiss 1999: 471; Radaelli 1995: 164). Both the prevailing
analytical understanding of the policy problem and the possibilities for competing
information to affect the way issues are framed in the policy process are influenced by
the organizational setting. Scho¨n and Rein (1994: 31), for example, discuss the fact that
policy frames do not exist in an institutional vacuum, and their research shows that
frames are often embedded in administrative decision-making structures (e.g., Rein and
Scho¨n 1996: 95; Scho¨n and Rein 1994: 28). But an early emphasis in this line of research
on the level of secondary institutional organization as a ‘decision matrix’ (Rein and
White 1977: 265) that structures policy development was not rigorously explored. The
fact that much of this literature ignores the structural level of analysis has repeatedly
drawn criticism (e.g., Feldman 1989: 145ff.; Huberman 1987: 589). The need to gain a
more systematic understanding of how the organizational characteristics of policy-mak-
ing systems influence the processing of information has therefore been highlighted
repeatedly (e.g., Rich and Oh 2000; Oh 1997a, b; Rich 1991).
Theoretical attention to the role of the organizational channels of information pro-
cessing becomes even more relevant if one recognizes that policy choices are commonly
made in highly information-rich environments (Simon 1973a: 270; Knott and Wildavsky
1980; Wildavsky 1983: 29; Weiss 1995: 149; Weiss 1999: 478; James and Jorgensen 2009:
148). While earlier studies of knowledge use frequently treated the supply and dissemi-
nation of information as problematic, more recent studies have argued that policy making
takes place in an environment routinely saturated with information. Under conditions of
information overload, theoretical interest shifts from the production and dissemination to
the ‘filtering’ and ‘mobilization’ of policy knowledge (James and Jorgensen 2009: 156). In
the policy process, this is largely accomplished through organizational structures and
hierarchies (Jones 2001). At the most basic level, every department or policy unit can be
analyzed as the organizational expression of a partial representation of complex policy
problems. Jurisdictional boundaries and departmental specialization delineate the relevant
knowledge bases, guide information search and preselect evaluative criteria used in the
analysis of available expertise. In short, organizations exist to suppress information
(Wildavsky 1983: 29).
Interest in knowledge use as organizational behavior leads Dery (1983, 1986, 1990)
to propose that studies of the policy process should focus more squarely on the role of
organizational epistemologies. Following Holzner and Fischer (1979), he stresses that a
core organizational function in the policy process is to provide perceptual filters and
direct attention toward selective aspects of the task environment (Dery 1990: 31, 1986:
Policy Sci (2015) 48:491–505 497
123
20). How political and administrative actors search for policy information and how they
interpret them depend foremost on the organizational context. Policy knowledge, Dery
(1990: 132) therefore argues, is the ‘product of political and bureaucratic processing.’
Since bureaucratic and political organizations acquire, interpreted and evaluated infor-
mation based on preexisting ‘conventions of knowing’ (Dery 1986: 19), information
that conflicts with the organizational premises is typically suppressed or rejected (Dery
1990: 128). An important consequence of the selective organizational processing of
policy knowledge is that issue perceptions and problem definitions are much more
likely to vary across different organizational units or subunits of government at any
given point in time than within a given organizational unit over time. The focus on
organizations as epistemologically closed systems thus contrasts sharply with the naı¨ve
empiricism of theories that uncritically extend notions like experimentation, verifiability
or fallibility to knowledge use by political and administrative agencies and highlights
the limits of organizational learning from experience as a major driver of conceptual
knowledge use in the policy process. Instead, it understands knowledge use as bound by
organizational rules of observation and inference, ‘such rules guide inquiry but cannot
be challenged by it’ (Dery 1990: 25; see also Holzner and Fisher 1979: 231). As a
result, Dery rejects the Kuhnian notion of learning from anomalies that informs major
strands of the literature on policy learning, such as Hall’s (1993) concept of paradig-
matic policy change or Sabatier’s (1986: 667, 1988: 145) understanding of changes in
the policy core of advocacy coalitions, as a plausible explanation of organization
behavior. Instead, Dery (1990: 32) contends that the potential for conflicting knowledge
to enter the decision-making process ‘lies not in experimentation and verification but in
contest.’
While political and administrative organizations are understood as epistemologically
closed systems, they rarely acquire the position of uncontested arbiters of policy
knowledge. Organizational epistemologies built into the policy process work to suppress
the transfer and use of information in their respective decision domains. But the
resulting partial representations of complex policy problems also offer political incen-
tives for the use of conflicting information. Policy research increasingly emphasizes that
many of the most relevant policy problems are ‘complex’ (Simon 1962), ‘ill-structured’
(Simon 1973b), or ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber 1973). Ill-structured or complex policy
problems by definition defy easy categorization. They frequently require policy
responses that depend on highly integrated government programs or remain partial at
best (Head and Alford 2015; Weber and Khademian 2008). Conflict over policy
authority and contestation of jurisdictional boundaries are therefore not only common
features of this type of policy making, but also difficult to resolve. While conflicts over
the structure of policy problems cannot be settled by analysis (Lindblom 1968: 14),
competing policy knowledge often gets drawn into the policy process in their wake.
The ‘potential interference of contestants, or contesting frames of reference,’ Dery
(1986: 21) argues, undercuts the ability of government organizations to ignore com-
peting problem perspectives and conflicting information. Conflicting knowledge thus
becomes more critical in the policy process when organizational frames of reference are
contestable. The following section discusses the theoretical and empirical implications
of this perspective in the context of the literature on policy change. The last section
then summarizes the main points and discusses them in the context of the larger
academic debates in this field of research.
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Two types of knowledge effects in the policy process: knowledge creep
and knowledge shifts
This article started out from the observation that research on knowledge use and studies of
the policy process have largely developed independently from one another. One important
consequence of the parallel development of these literatures is the limited way in which
knowledge use has been linked theoretically to different types of policy change. The
established view is that consolidated evidence has a cumulative effect on the way policy
makers make sense of the problems they face and transforms policy choices incrementally
over time. This dynamic has become known as knowledge creep. Its formulation was
informed by a revised understanding of the way knowledge influences policy choices that
emphasizes conceptual rather than instrumental knowledge use. While the above analysis
followed previous debates in terms of its focus on conceptual knowledge use, it also
remained dissatisfied with the limited theoretical exploration of the political function of
conceptual knowledge. The reconceptualization of the political use of knowledge devel-
oped in the previous sections sheds new light on the role of knowledge in the policy
process. The baseline assumption is that policy knowledge can be used to contest given
structures of policy authority and that knowledge used to reframe a policy along the lines
of contestable boundaries of policy authority will enter the policy process more forcefully
than other types of knowledge. Understanding organizations as epistemologically closed
systems underscores that under conditions of low contestability even mounting pressure for
adaptation will likely be met by attempts to disregard and dismiss, if not outright discredit,
conflicting knowledge. The notion of contestability therefore implies that the scope and
likelihood of knowledge effects depend foremost on the degree to which conflicting
knowledge can be used by potential contestants to construct knowledge claims that chal-
lenge established patterns of influence. Dery (1990: 128) therefore concludes that
administrative and political competition and dispersed policy responsibilities are the main
features of policy systems that ‘constrain the tendency to suppress, and the inclination to
overlook disconfirming data’ in the policy process.
In her later research, Carol Weiss (1999: 480) appears to adopt a similar point of view
when she argues that knowledge stands a better chance at affecting policy change in
‘competitive political systems’ and under conditions of ‘decentralization’ of policy that
leave government control dispersed across different levels. The existence of ‘multiple
points of access within the policy system,’ Weiss (1999: 480) holds, is a central factor in
explanations of knowledge use in the policy process. While her empirical observations of
the conditions of knowledge use thus largely correspond with the preceding analysis, it
remains unclear whether policy systems with high levels of fragmentation and competition
are expected to facilitate the diffuse and incremental processes of knowledge creep that are
the focus of her research or other types of knowledge effects. In major strands of policy
research, the view that fragmentation and contestability of policy authority are linked to
discontinuous and disproportional knowledge use rather than incremental knowledge creep
is more widely established. These literatures build on the analysis of administrative
structures as mechanisms of compartmentalization in political decision making. Complex
problems are factorized into more manageable tasks that are addressed separately in largely
independent subsystems (Simon 1973a: 270). While the autonomous processing of dif-
ferent aspects of policy in independent subsystems is a rational response to the complex
and information-rich task environments of modern policy-making systems, the ‘design for
informational autonomy’ (Huber 1991: 104) also reduced the possibility for knowledge
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transfer and organizational learning. At the same time, fragmented responsibilities and
overlapping competences generate an influx of incompatible information and create
pressure on existing decision-making structures to accommodate competing knowledge
claims (Workman et al. 2009: 84). Because partial problem perceptions and selective
organizational attention are structurally embedded, the transfer and use of conflicting
knowledge and the resulting policy adaptation are typically seen as episodic and delayed
rather than incremental and continuous. Irregular punctuations of the policy process are
therefore the expected result (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).
Conceptual knowledge that affects policy choices in this way is more accurately
described as knowledge shift rather than knowledge creep. Conflicting information enters
the policy process when policy authority is reassigned to new institutional structures of
decision making. In such cases, the former informational foundation of policy making is
replaced by a new knowledge base and the existing policy regime is replaced. Conflicting
knowledge is therefore not integrated into existing policy structures, but plays a major part
in replacing them. This line of argument places the political use of conceptual knowledge
more firmly in the context of theories of policy punctuation and greatly expands the range
of policy dynamics with which the use of conceptual knowledge in the policy process is
theoretically associated. It also conforms with the widely accepted notion that fundamental
policy change is most likely when policy institutions themselves undergo transformation,
while incremental policy change as described by the literature on knowledge creep is
characteristic of decisions reached within existing policy structures (Howlett and Migone
2011: 57–58). While all policy systems adjust the ways in which they assign policy
authority from time to time (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), some policy systems or sectors
are expected to be more responsive to competing knowledge and more easily adjusted
structurally. This in turn has effects on the scope and likelihood of knowledge effects on
policy change. The central question thus becomes under what conditions knowledge creep
or knowledge shifts are the more likely effects of conflicting information in the policy
process.
Both types of knowledge effects appear more likely that the more open and dispersed
policy authority is organized in a given policy system. This is viewed as a precondition for
conflicting knowledge to even enter the policy process. The preceding analysis therefore
implies that the question of whether knowledge creep or knowledge shifts prevail depends
largely on the way the organization of policy authority renders organizational knowledge
more or less contestable. Contestability is influenced primarily by features of the policy
system at the level of secondary institutional organization, or what Rein and White (1977:
265) have called the ‘decision matrix.’ This places the analytical emphasis on the orga-
nizational characteristics of administrative structures, such as the degree and nature of
administrative specialization, the rigidity of departmental boundaries, and the degree of
overlap and duplication of responsibilities across policy organizations. The degrees of
vertical specialization, for example, offer insights into the extent to which administrative
units are placed hierarchically under direct political control or remain organizationally
independent from political influence. In the case of strong vertical specialization, orga-
nizational epistemologies can be expected to be generally more distinct and pronounced,
oftentimes in form of allegiance to some form of scientific or professional expertise.
Independent central banks, for example, are generally expected to pay special attention to
some select indicators, such as the level of inflation, in assessing conflicting information
concerning overall economic performance. Their organizational epistemologies and
organizational insulation from political influence thus render them generally less suscep-
tible to knowledge shifts. Knowledge creep appears the more likely effect of conceptual
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knowledge use. If we turn the attention to the dimension of horizontal specialization,
contestability will depend largely on the respective logic of departmental organization. If
policy authority in a public health sector is organized in a way that separates responsi-
bilities according to a functional criterion between one branch of the organization that
deals with treatment and another that deals with prevention, for example, research that
points toward prevention as the more effective policy approach would likely cause
extensive political knowledge use and open up the possibility for far-reaching knowledge
shifts. If policy authority was organized by sector, on the other hand, this type of
knowledge effect would appear far less likely. Knowledge creep may still occur, but almost
certainly with less far-reaching results and only after long-term consolidation and con-
vergence of available evidence. Since political knowledge use is more likely to play a role
at the intersection of competing organizational frames of reference, duplication and
overlap of policy responsibilities generally make knowledge shifts more likely. Knowledge
that links the risk of homelessness to mental illness, for example, can affect shifts of policy
authority from social programs aimed at financial assistance to public health programs. If
policy responsibilities in this sector are organized in a single more unitary and vertically
integrated administration, on the other hand, this would shield the organizational knowl-
edge base more effectively from the risk of intrusion. Conflicting information is likely to
be disregarded or dismissed as irrelevant, even undermining knowledge creep. Irrespective
of the specific dimension of analysis, the more general point is that both the scope and the
likelihood of knowledge creep and knowledge shifts can be linked to characteristics at the
level of secondary institutional organization in the respective policy system or sector,
specifically the way in which organizational epistemologies are rendered contestable or
insulated from the intrusion of conflicting knowledge.
Summary and conclusions
This article has inquired into the political use of knowledge in the policy process.
Throughout the analysis, an effort was made to identify insights from dispersed fields of
research that can contribute to a more complete conceptualization of the use of knowledge
in the policy process and advance the aim of integrating knowledge research and studies of
the policy process more closely. In its focus on the conceptual use of knowledge, the article
reflects the overall theoretical reorientation in this field of study over the past decades. This
does not mean that instrumental knowledge use has failed to attract academic attention. As
argued above, much of the recent debate on evidence-based policy making can be read as
an extension of this research tradition. At the same time, the existing literature on con-
ceptual knowledge use was nevertheless seen as highly incomplete. A first serious problem
with the existing literature is that it routinely conflates conceptual and substantive use. The
near exclusive research emphasis is on the question of how knowledge use can inform the
formulation of policy alternatives. The article has argued that conceptual knowledge use
has both a substantive dimension and a political dimension. Existing conceptualizations of
the political use of knowledge, however, have remained so uniformly minimalistic as to
prevent any meaningful investigation of the phenomenon. The article therefore introduced
a broader definition of political knowledge use that emphasized the role of knowledge in
contests over policy authority and the structure of political control. A second problem with
the existing literature on conceptual use was that it remains largely silent on the range of
underlying mechanisms. The concept of knowledge creep, as Weiss argued herself, has
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remained little more than a descriptive metaphor. In this context, the role of organizational
epistemologies was discussed to underscore that the use of conceptual knowledge in the
policy process is bound by organizationally embedded rules of observation and inference
in ways much of this literature has failed to address. As a result, the implicit notion of
policy learning as the main driver of conceptual knowledge use in the enlightenment model
was partially rejected in favor of a logic of administrative and political contestation. This
allowed the analysis to differentiate between knowledge creep and knowledge shifts as two
distinct types of knowledge effects in the policy process. While knowledge creep is
associated with incremental policy change within existing policy structures, knowledge
shifts were linked to more fundamental policy change in situations when policy institutions
themselves undergo some level of transformation. The remainder of the article tentatively
identified conditions under which knowledge creep or knowledge shifts are expected to
become more likely by showing how the structure of policy systems or sectors at the level
of secondary institutional organization can render knowledge in the policy process more or
less contestable.
Along the way, the analysis has taken issue with some widely accepted positions in
knowledge research. In particular, the common contention that conflict invariably con-
strains the use and counteracts the effects of knowledge in the policy process was fun-
damentally called into question. In Weiss’ (1999: 471) analysis, the ‘endemic priority of
politics’ in organizational decision making is seen as the main reason why knowledge does
not play a larger role in policy formulation. The article has contended that this conclusion
is largely the result of the conceptual limitations of important parts of this literature. In a
similar vein, the frequent association of the political use of knowledge with ‘endarken-
ment’ (Weiss 1979) as opposed to ‘enlightenment’ appears largely unfounded. The base-
line assumption of the preceding analysis was that conflicting knowledge can be used to
contest given structures of policy authority. This logic implies that political knowledge use
is reflective of the way policy-making structures process information selectively. The
article has also made it clear, however, that any theory of knowledge use that takes the
effects of organizational epistemologies seriously views the role of knowledge in the
policy process as bound by structural constraints in even the best of circumstances. To
understand the mechanisms through which these boundaries can become contested and
occasionally readjust to reflect evolving problem perceptions in the policy process is
therefore crucial—not only for a better understanding of the disruptive effects of knowl-
edge shifts, but also for assessing the ways in which knowledge can illuminate complex
policy choices.
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national License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
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